Standard Securities
提出收集陌生证券信息的高成本可能导致标准化收益，即企业发行其他企业已使用的证券。信息必须不可转移且通用，才能支持标准化作为均衡现象。竞争均衡可能存在协调失败，包括帕累托排序的均衡。
The cost of gathering information about unfamiliar securities may lead to gains from standardization: firms issue a particular security because it is used by other firms. To support standardization as an equilibrium phenomenon, information must be non-transferable (otherwise it might be revealed by prices or the observation of other agents' decisions) and it must be generic (useful in evaluating a number of securities). A competitive equilibrium in which standard contracts are used may be subject to coordination failure: while there always exists a constrained efficient equilibrium, there may also exist Pareto-ranked equilibria.