Institutional Markets, Financial Marketing, and Financial Innovation
从代理理论视角分析机构在金融市场中的行为，说明即使新工具能被完全定价，机构对解决道德风险的需求仍会催生金融创新，并以剥离证券为例展示其供需与营销。
Firms and institutions are monitored and controlled through a complex set of implicit and explicit contractual relations. Because of these agency theoretic relations, institutional behavior in financial markets is not a simple reflection of the preference structures of individuals. Institutional preferences give rise to a demand for new financial instruments and innovations, even when the returns on these instruments are "spanned" in the sense of complete pricing. The innovations can be thought of as solving moral hazard problems. An agency theoretic example serves to illustrate the demand, supply, and financial marketing of stripped securities. In short, institutions matter.