Optimal Discretion
研究了在存在动态不一致性但无根本目标冲突的模型中，采用规则还是相机抉择货币政策更优。发现当通胀超过内生阈值时规则最优，从而形成通胀相机抉择区间，不完全可信度会缩小该区间。
We investigate the desirability of adopting a rule in favor of discretionary monetary policy in a model exhibiting Kydland and Prescott's dynamic inconsistency problem but no fundamental incompatibility between the policymaker's price stability and full employment objectives. We show that if discretion provides a policy flexibility benefit, then a rule is optimal only when inflation exceeds an endogenously determined threshold. This gives rise to a discretionary policy zone for inflation with the central bank taking more drastic action towards stabilizing inflation when inflation veers outside the zone. Imperfect credibility narrows the scope for discretion and enhances the benefits of adopting a rule.