Deliberately Stochastic
研究了故意随机化作为选择结果，推导出随机选择函数的一般表示，其中随机性使代理人能从任何集合中根据其对彩票的潜在偏好实现最大元素，并表明该模型中随机性捕捉了集合中元素间的互补性，必然违反随机选择的常见性质Regularity/Monotonicity。
We study stochastic choice as the outcome of deliberate randomization. We derive a general representation of a stochastic choice function where stochasticity allows the agent to achieve from any set the maximal element according to her underlying preferences over lotteries. We show that in this model stochasticity in choice captures complementarity between elements in the set, and thus necessarily implies violations of Regularity/Monotonicity, one of the most common properties of stochastic choice. This feature separates our approach from other models, e.g., Random Utility.