Delinquent Networks
研究犯罪者如何在关系网络中非合作地决定犯罪努力程度，并设计最优执法策略，包括针对关键个体、关键群体和网络链接的干预，以及考虑劳动市场选择的影响。
Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal,the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.