Residual Deterrence
研究了执法成功事件导致犯罪暂时减少的“残余威慑”现象，通过引入执法启动成本，解释了执法官员和潜在罪犯双方的激励，并探讨了最优执法机构设计。
Abstract Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or “residual deterrence”. We provide a theory of residual deterrence that accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring specialized staff, undertaking targeted research and coordinating personnel. We illustrate how our model can be used to address a number of policy questions regarding the optimal design of enforcement authorities.