一种高效的多物品升价拍卖:回应

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply

American Economic Review · 2018
被引 14
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

回应了Okamoto对Ausubel(2004)中配给规则错误设定的指正,阐述了动态拍卖中诚实出价的最优性可能对配给规则的细节敏感,并讨论了顺序出价处理在恢复诚实出价中的作用。

Abstract

In a comment, Okamoto (2018 ) identifies and corrects a misspecification of the rationing rule in Ausubel (2004 ). This reply elaborates on the observation that the optimality of truthful bidding in dynamic auctions may be sensitive to the fine details of the rationing rule. It then discusses the wider role of sequential bid processing in restoring truthful bidding.

拍卖理论动态拍卖真实报价配给规则