A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure and Call Provisions in the Agency Theoretic Framework
用债务的代理成本解释复杂金融工具的存在，重点讨论赎回条款和期限结构如何解决信息不对称、经理人风险激励和增长机会丧失等代理问题。
The agency costs of debt are introduced in this paper to explain the existence of complex financial instruments. Two areas of complexities are discussed in detail: the call provision and the maturity structure of debt. Their existence is rationalized as a means of resolving agency problems associated with informational asymmetry, managerial (stockholder) risk incentives, and foregone growth opportunities. It is also demonstrated that both features of corporate debt serve identical purposes in solving agency problems. Complex financial instruments are required because markets fail to provide complete and costless solutions to the agency problems discussed in the paper.