Dynamic Deception
研究了一个资源受限的知情玩家与一系列部分观察其行动强度的对手之间的连续时间博弈均衡，揭示了强度约束导致的策略偏差和不知情玩家的序列均值回归，并计算了知情玩家信息优势的持续时间。
We characterize the unique equilibrium of a competitive continuous time game between a resource-constrained informed player and a sequence of rivals who partially observe his action intensity. Our game adds noisy monitoring and impatient players to Aumann and Maschler (1966), and also subsumes insider trading models. The intensity bound induces a novel strategic bias and serial mean reversion by uninformed players. We compute the duration of the informed player's informational edge. The uninformed player's value of information is concave if the intensity bound is large enough. Costly obfuscation by the informed player optimally rises in the public deception.