Reliant behavior in the United States and Japan
通过一个两人博弈实验，比较美日未来商人的行为，发现日本人在某些情境下反而更少依赖他人、更可能违背群体福利，挑战了文化解释。
Japanese economic success is often attributed to culturally reinforced psychological conditioning that promotes interpersonal reliance, cooperation, and a group interest orientation. This article provides direct experimental evidence on differences in behavior among future business people in the United States and Japan. Utilizing a simple, two person extensive form game of perfect information introduced by Selten (1975), we provide evidence that, contrary to some views, the Japanese can be less reliant on the behavior of others and are more likely to take actions at variance with group welfare in some settings. Thus, popular explanations of Japanese economic achievements may require further exploration.