Aggressive leaders
分析了在纳什竞争和内生进入的市场中，企业进行战略投资的动机，发现当投资能提高边际利润时，只有“领头狗”策略是最优的，即市场领导者会过度投资以降低成本或互补产品，从而采取更激进的定价策略。
I characterize the incentives to undertake strategic investments in markets with Nash competition and endogenous entry. Contrary to the case with an exogenous number of firms, when the investment increases marginal profitability, only a “top dog” strategy is optimal. For instance, under both quantity and price competition, a market leader overinvests in cost reductions and overproduces complement products. The purpose of the strategic investment is to allow the firm to be more aggressive in the market and to reduce its price below those of other firms. Contrary to the post‐Chicago approach, this shows that aggressive pricing strategies are not necessarily associated with exclusionary purposes .