Exclusionary Contracts
本文综合排他性合同理论，分析市场参与者签订排他性合同的动机，并应用于尼尔森反垄断案，探讨了与下游买家及上游供应商的合同如何排除潜在进入者。
When have market participants the incentive to strike contracts that exclude potential entrants? This article synthesizes the theory of exclusionary contracts and applies the theory to a recent antitrust case, Nielsen. We consider an incumbent facing potential entry and contracting with both upstream suppliers and downstream buyers. Focusing first on contracts with downstream buyers, we set out a “Chicago benchmark” set of assumptions that yields no incentive for exclusionary contracts. Departing from the benchmark in each of three directions yields a theory of exclusion. These include the two existing theories, developed by Aghion and Boulton and by Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley. The structure also captures a third, vertical theory: long-term contracts at one stage of a supply chain can extract rents from a firm with market power at another stage. Turning to upstream contracts, we offer a theory of simultaneous contract offers that generalizes the “Colonel Blotto” game. Nielsen illustrates the full range of the predictions of the theories of exclusionary contracts.