Pay Inequality
研究当经济增长依赖劳动力从老旧低效工厂向新型高效工厂持续重新配置时，通过集中集体谈判压缩工资对利润和新工厂进入的影响。
The authors investigate the effects of wage compression through centralized collective bargaining when growth depends on the continual reallocation of labor from older, less productive plants to new, more productive plants. They first study the compression of wage differentials that derive from decentralized bargaining in heterogeneous plants. The authors then consider wage compression when wage differentials arise from competition among employers over workers of differing quality. They show that wage compression through centralized bargaining can result in higher profits and greater entry of new plants than either decentralized bargaining or a competitive labor market. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.