Underwriter Compensation and Corporate Monitoring
提出承销银团的主承销商不仅提供营销和认证服务，还监督经理人努力，从而提升公司价值；监督水平与可认证的发行价格之间存在对应关系，并提供了支持银团发挥公司监督作用的新证据。
Studies suggest that underwriting syndicates provide marketing services and certify the fairness of offer prices. We argue that syndicate lead banks also monitor manager effort, increasing the value of capital-raising companies. A given level of monitoring is associated with a given level of intrinsic value, so there is a “schedule” of certifiable offer prices, depending on the level of monitoring. Monitoring, marketing, and certification are, therefore, all legitimate syndicate functions. New evidence supporting the conclusion that syndicates provide corporate monitoring is presented.