Strategic Appointments
本文提出一个制度空间理论，分析总统对行政机构的任命策略，发现盟友原则仅在极端条件下成立，总统更应任命能部分抵消组织利益影响的行政官员。
This article develops an institutional spatial theory of presidential appointments to administrative agencies that falls within the spirit of a recent line of theoretical research toward an institutional theory of the presidency. We show that when bureaucrats implement policy that results from negotiation with constituents, the ally principle—appointing political allies—holds only as a knife-edge condition. Presidents are better served by appointing administrators whose preferences partially offset the influence of organized interests. The incentives described have implications for the selection of a whole range of bureaucratic personnel at various levels, generating significant implications for the study of public management on issues such as personnel administration, representative bureaucracy, and the devolution of administrative authority.