Assessing TARP
研究了问题资产救助计划（TARP）下资本购买计划（CPP）对银行的股权注入，发现强银行选择退出，而面临系统性风险但资产质量好的银行接受了注资，高管薪酬担忧导致部分银行拒绝，CPP本身认证效应有限，但后续压力测试有显著认证效应。
We study the government equity infusions into banks under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Strong banks opted out of CPP, and equity infusions were provided to banks that posed systemic risk and faced high financial distress costs but had strong asset quality. Concerns over executive compensation led banks to reject CPP infusions and exit the program. CPP infusions did not have meaningful certification effects, but the subsequent stress tests conducted for the major banks had significant certification effects. CPP equity infusions increased investor expectations regarding future regulatory interventions in the banking sector. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.