Sequential Screening
研究消费者在签约时只知道估值分布、之后才知真实估值的价格歧视问题，通过退款合同菜单实现序贯筛选，发现最优机制取决于消费者初始估值不确定性的信息含量，而非影响所有消费者的不确定性。
We study price discrimination where consumers know at the time of contracting only the distribution of their valuations but subsequently learn their actual valuations. Consumers are sequentially screened, as in a menu of refund contracts. Initial valuation uncertainty can differ in terms of first-order stochastic dominance or mean-preserving-spread. In both cases, optimal mechanisms depend on informativeness of consumers' initial knowledge about their valuations, not on uncertainty that affects all consumers. It can be optimal to "subsidize" consumers with smaller valuation uncertainty through low refund to reduce the rent to those who face greater uncertainty and purchase more "flexible" contracts.