Information congestion
研究未经请求的广告信息（如垃圾邮件、推销电话）如何争夺稀缺的注意力，分析发送者与接收者的行为如何导致信息拥堵，并评估“禁止来电”政策与垄断守门人的福利效果。
Unsolicited advertising messages vie for scarce attention. “Junk” mail, “spam” e‐mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message receivers supply attention according to average message benefit, while the marginal sender determines congestion. Costlier transmission may improve average message benefit so more messages are examined. Too many (too few) messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do‐Not‐Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate. The welfare results still hold when messages are presorted (triage).