World Integration, Competitive and Bargaining-Regime Switch: An Exploration
研究两个贸易集团在自由贸易与谈判贸易之间的选择，分析资本分配如何受技术替代性和谈判成本影响，发现谈判均衡能分散国家特定供给冲击，但成本高低决定贸易依赖程度。
The author considers two trading blocs that can engage in a free trade or a bargaining-dictated trade. Output is produced by several technologies that offer different substitutability between domestic and foreign inputs. Capital is allocated between the various technologies prior to the resolution of uncertainty. The switch to the bargaining equilibrium is shown to diversify country-specific supply shocks. If the bargaining costs are small, trade dependency and bargaining are exploited to allow for the diversification of national shocks. If the bargaining costs are large, countries will invest in trade-independent technologies and the incidence of bargaining will be minimized.