Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium
识别了一个包含应税股息的信号均衡，解释了为何有些公司同时发放股息并发行新股，而其他公司不支付股息，并推导了公告效应和除息日市场价值的关系。
A signalling equilibrium with taxable dividends is identified. In this equilibrium, corporate insiders with more valuable private information optimally distribute larger dividends and receive higher prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash by both their firm and its current stockholders exceeds its internal supply of cash. In equilibrium, many firms distribute dividends and simultaneously issue new stock, while other firms pay no dividends. Because dividends reveal all private information not conveyed by corporate audits, current stockholders capture in equilibrium all economic rents net of dissipative signalling costs. Both the announcement effect and the relationship between dividends and cum-dividend market values are derived explicitly.