Strategic Deterrence Among Multipoint Competitors
结合组织生态学和战略理论，研究多点竞争对手间的战略威慑如何影响行业洗牌，发现弱竞争者因对手的克制而比强竞争者更易存活，且战略群体间的竞争受流动性壁垒影响。
Theory and methods from organizational ecology and the strategy field are combined to predict the dynamic consequences of strategic deterrence. A model is developed to investigate which strategies will prevail through an industry ‘shake out’ when some firms compete while others forbear from competing with their ‘multipoint’ rivals—those faced in more than one markes or market segment. Theory predicts that multipoint contact affects competition within but not between strategic groups, and it is speculated that whether multipoint contact deters competition depends on strategic objectives. The predictions are supported by estimates of market exit rates in the customer premises equipment and service (CPES) sector of the deregulated American telephone industry. The results show that, due to forbearance, weak competitors can out-survive strong competitors. Evidence also is found that strategic groups not protected by mobility barriers face strong competition from other strategic groups. Implications for the study of strategic evolution are discussed.