Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions
构建并实验检验了一个共同价值拍卖模型，其中竞拍者可以自主选择参与拍卖还是接受外部安全收益，拍卖价格由最高出价决定，市场参与者数量内生确定。
Abstract We develop and experimentally test a model of endogenous entry, exit, and bidding in common value auctions. The model and experimental design include an alternative profitable activity (a “safe haven”) that provides agent-specific opportunity costs of bidding in the auction. Each agent chooses whether to accept the safe haven income or forgo it in order to bid in the auction. Agents that enter the auction receive independently-drawn private signals that provide unbiased estimates of the common value. The auctioned item is allocated to the high bidder at a price that is equal to the high bid. Thus the market is a first-price sealed-bid common value auction with endogenous determination of market size.