Pattern Bargaining*
研究美国工会常用的模式谈判策略，发现工会更偏好模式谈判而非同时或顺序谈判；当行业内企业生产率差异小时，工会偏好工资模式，差异大时则偏好劳动成本模式；模式谈判还能有效阻止新企业进入。
Many unions in the United States have for several years engaged in what is known as pattern bargaining. In this article, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industry‐wide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern. Allowing for interfirm productivity differentials within an industry, we show that for small differentials, the union most prefers a pattern in wages, but for a sufficiently wide differential, the union prefers a pattern in labor costs. Finally, we demonstrate that pattern bargaining can be a significant entry deterrent. This provides an explanation for why incumbent firms in an industry may support the use of pattern bargaining in labor negotiations.