Stapled Finance
研究了并购中卖方安排的搭售融资承诺如何通过补贴弱势竞标者来加剧竞价竞争，并分析了其对卖方收益和贷款表现的影响。
ABSTRACT “Stapled finance” is a loan commitment arranged by a seller in an M&A setting. Whoever wins the bidding contest has the option (not the obligation) to accept this loan commitment. We show that stapled finance increases bidding competition by subsidizing weak bidders, who raise their bids and thereby the price that strong bidders (who are more likely to win) must pay. The lender expects not to break even and must be compensated for offering the loan. This reduces but does not eliminate the seller's benefit. It also implies that stapled finance loans will show poorer performance than other buyout loans.