Signaling and Takeover Deterrence with Stock Repurchases: Dutch Auctions Versus Fixed Price Tender Offers
构建了一个回购要约模型，分析荷兰式拍卖与固定价格两种方法的选择：荷兰式回购更有效威慑收购，固定价格回购更有效传递低估信号，并推导出关于回购价格效应、收购概率、管理层薪酬和股票供给弹性等实证含义。
This article presents a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms choose between the Dutch auction method and the fixed price method. Dutch auction repurchases are more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation. The model yields empirical implications regarding price effects of repurchases, likelihood of takeover, managerial compensation, and cross-sectional differences in the elasticity of the supply curve for shares.