Cost‐effectiveness of alternative green payment policies for conservation technology adoption with heterogeneous land quality
定量分析了针对异质性微观单元实现污染控制目标的两种绿色支付政策（成本分摊补贴和投入削减补贴）的成本效益，并与污染税比较，发现这些政策在激励类型上受限，可能导致土地扩张，并通过加州灌溉棉花生产的模拟进行了验证。
Abstract This paper quantitatively analyses the cost‐effectiveness of alternative green payment policies designed to achieve a targeted level of pollution control by heterogeneous microunits. These green payment policies include cost‐share subsidies that share the fixed costs of adoption of a conservation technology and/or input reduction subsidies to reduce the use of a polluting input. The paper shows that unlike a pollution tax that achieves abatement through three mechanisms, a negative extensive margin effect, a negative intensive margin effect and a technology switching effect, a cost‐share subsidy and an input reduction subsidy are much more restricted in the types of incentives they provide for conservation of polluting inputs and adoption of a conservation technology to control pollution. Moreover, they may lead to varying levels of expansion of land under production. Costs of abatement with alternative policies and implications for production and government payments are compared using a simulation model for controlling drainage from irrigated cotton production in California, with drip irrigation as a conservation technology.