Importing Credibility through Exchange Rate Pegging
用最优税收框架研究开放经济中货币政策可信度，指出浮动汇率下通胀扰动使当局行为难被监督，而钉住低通胀货币可改善监督、输入信誉并实现最优均衡。
This paper employs an optimal taxation framework in order to study the credibility of monetary policy-making in an open economy. Since inflation is, in part, uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances, the authority's actions cannot be monitored perfectly when the exchange rate floats, thus implying that reputational forces may become ineffective. In contrast, pegging the nominal exchange rate to a low-inflation currency allows perfect monitoring, because the exchange rate is, in principle, controllable. For this reason, exchange rate pegging may import credibility and result in the best reputational equilibrium, even though the authority retains the discretion to devalue unexpectedly.