Vertical Territorial Restrictions and Public Policy: Theories and Industry Evidence
研究了企业使用纵向地域限制的效率动机（信息不对称和交易成本）与反竞争效应，发现制造商在面临事前竞争时更可能使用此类限制，最终可能削弱品牌间竞争，支持美国的合理原则而质疑欧洲的本身违法原则。
Territorial restrictions long have been the subject of intense policy debate. The central issue in this debate has been whether such distribution arrangements are deployed for efficiency or anticompetitive purposes. The authors add to the debate by broadening the existing conceptualization of business efficiency and providing evidence of the importance of efficiency considerations in the decision to deploy restrictions. In the past, efficiency often has been viewed narrowly, in terms of giving distributors incentives to provide free-rideable services. The authors show that information asymmetry and transaction costs also represent important efficiency-based explanations of territorial restrictions. With regard to anticompetitive concerns, their results show that manufacturers are more likely to use territorial restrictions when they face competition ex ante. Ultimately, this may reduce interbrand competition. From a public policy perspective, their pattern of results supports the current rule of reason treatment of territorial restrictions in the United States. At the same time it questions the current European policy of per se illegality.