Information and bargaining in the hold-up problem
在经典敲竹杠问题中引入部分信息结构，发现最优信息结构在一次性讨价还价中处于中等信息不对称水平，而在重复讨价还价中达到完全不对称，表明信息不对称是重要的福利工具。
This article incorporates an information structure with partial information into the canonical hold-up problem. The optimal information structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency (the information rent effect) and ex post efficiency (the bargaining disagreement effect). With one-shot bargaining, it occurs at an intermediate level of information asymmetry; when there is repeated bargaining, it is attained with perfect asymmetry. Asymmetric information, the parameter that is frequently ignored in the literature, turns out to be an important welfare instrument for the hold-up problem. Our results therefore provide a basis for institutional design regarding the optimal control of information flow. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.