康德均衡

Kantian Equilibrium

Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 2010
被引 201 · 同刊同年前 6%
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

提出一种新的均衡概念“康德均衡”,即所有玩家按相同比例调整贡献时无人愿意改变,该均衡具有帕累托效率,并统一了生产经济中的比例解和公共品经济中的线性成本分摊均衡,在囚徒困境、投票和再分配政治经济学中展现合作性。

Abstract

Consider a game whose strategies are “contributions”. A strategy profile is a Kantian equilibrium if no player would like all players to alter their contributions by the same multiplicative factor. Kantian equilibria are Pareto efficient. We characterize the allocation rules on several domains of environments that can be implemented as Kantian equilibria. The concept unifies the proportional solution on production economies and the linear cost-share equilibrium on public-good economies. We study Kantian equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma, in a voting problem, and in a political economy where redistribution is the issue. The Kantian dictum engenders considerable but not unqualified cooperation.

博弈论微观经济学政治经济学一般均衡理论