Corporate Tournaments
基于锦标赛理论，分析企业内部的薪酬与晋升机制，发现多数职位通过内部晋升填补、薪酬随层级显著上升，但CEO锦标赛的奖金与竞争者数量呈非线性关系，且长期任职会削弱晋升激励。
This study examines aspects of pay and promotion in corporate hierarchies in the context of tournament theory. Evidence supports the tournament perspective in that most positions are filled through promotion and pay rises strongly with hierarchical level. Furthermore, the winner's prize in the CEO tournament increases with the number of competitors for the CEO position. Not all evidence is supportive: the square of the number of competitors is negatively associated with the CEO prize. Additionally, firms do not appear to maintain short-term promotion incentives, as lengthier time in position prior to a promotion reduces the pay increase from the promotion. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.