Good Offices: Intermediation by Corporate Bodies in Early Modern French Public Finance
研究了旧制度君主制（尤其是路易十四时期）如何通过特权法人机构在私人市场寻找放贷人并充当违约担保人，比较不同机构的债权人群体，重新审视近代早期金融革命史学中的宪政-专制二分法。
The old-regime monarchy, particularly during the reign of Louis XIV, did much of its borrowing through the mediation of privileged corporate bodies that sought lenders on the private market and then acted as guarantors against royal default. After comparing the creditors of various privileged bodies and considering the reasons why some were more successful than others in attracting a wide circle of creditors, this study argues for a reconsideration of the constitutional-absolutist dichotomy in the historiography of the early modern financial revolution.