Vertical and Horizontal Agency Problems in Private Firms: Ownership Structure and Operating Performance
研究了英国超过42,000家私营和上市公司，发现所有权不平等导致的横向代理成本、与所有权控制分离的纵向代理成本叠加会放大问题，而第二大股东能缓解代理成本。
Abstract We investigate how ownership structure influences operating performance and implied agency costs. Our sample includes over 42,000 U.K. private and public firms. We document several new results of considerable economic significance relating to i) horizontal agency costs arising from unequal ownership within private firms, ii) amplification of agency costs from joint presence within the same firm of horizontal agency problems and vertical agency problems arising from separation of ownership and control, iii) mitigation in agency costs wrought by a second large shareholder, iv) impact of complex ownership structures, and v) agency cost differences between public firms and comparable private firms.