Valuing Diversity
构建了一个模型，研究提升弱势身份群体地位的政策，发现当身份可契约时，有效政策是给予优先准入而非技能补贴；当身份不可契约时，若弱势群体在技能发展边际上的比例大于岗位分配边际，则需提供普遍技能补贴。
This paper explores the economics of diversity-enhancing policies. A model is proposed in which heterogeneous agents, distinguished by skill level and social identity, purchase productive opportunities in a competitive market. We analyze policies designed to raise the status of a disadvantaged identity group. When agent identity is contractible, efficient policy grants preferred access to slots but offers no direct assistance for acquiring skills. When identity is not contractible, efficient policy provides universal subsidies to skill development when the fraction of the disadvantaged group at the skill development margin is larger than their share at the slot assignment margin.