Opportunistic Termination
研究了买方利用货物不符合同作为借口终止合同（机会主义终止）的积极效应，发现它能在不损失效率的情况下向买方再分配利益，并可能通过削弱卖方垄断权力提高社会福利。
If a seller delivers a good nonconforming to contract, European and US warranty laws allow consumers to choose between some money transfer and termination. Termination rights are, however, widely criticized, mainly for fear that the buyer may use nonconformity as a pretext for getting rid of a contract he no longer wants. We show that this possibility of “opportunistic termination” might actually have positive effects. Under some circumstances, it will lead to redistribution in favor of the buyer without any loss of efficiency. Moreover, by curbing the monopoly power of the seller, a regime involving termination might increase welfare by enabling a more efficient output level in a setting with multiple buyers. These potential benefits are absent if renegotiation is possible.