Collateral Crises
研究了短期抵押债务（私人货币）的效率与金融脆弱性的内生形成，发现经济依赖信息不敏感债务时低质量抵押品企业可借贷引发信贷繁荣，而小冲击可能触发信息生产导致危机，社会规划者会生产更多信息但不会完全消除脆弱性。
Short-term collateralized debt, private money, is efficient if agents are willing to lend without producing costly information about the collateral backing the debt. When the economy relies on such informationally insensitive debt, firms with low quality collateral can borrow, generating a credit boom and an increase in output. Financial fragility is endogenous; it builds up over time as information about counterparties decays. A crisis occurs when a ( possibly small) shock causes agents to suddenly have incentives to produce information, leading to a decline in output. A social planner would produce more information than private agents but would not always want to eliminate fragility.