Cooperating Adversaries
论证了互惠利他主义如何促使工人与企业从低生产率对抗点转向高生产率合作点，并给出了停止规则：通过修改效用函数和报酬结构，将囚徒困境转化为合作均衡。
SUMMARY In this paper we argue that mutual altruism might explain why workers and a firm move from low‐productivity adversarial point(s) to high‐productivity cooperative point(s). The unique critical level of such altruism is identified and hence a stopping rule is provided: The mutual altruism solution to an otherwise prisoner's dilemma equilibrium depends on representing an agent's (workers, firm) preferences as a specific convex combination of his and the other agent's original utilities. The move to the cooperative point(s) is facilitated by revision of the utility functions and a consequent change in the payoffs. This, in turn, is brought about through intrafirm processes such as furnishing employees with superior compensation packages as well as through an interfirm process ‐ drawing lessons from ‘shocks’ ‐ the experience of firms which, as they were locked in low productivity equilibrium points, were weeded out.