Lender Forbearance
利用阈值设计研究贷款人在契约违约后的执行行为，发现执行频率低但后果严重，且具有顺周期性，受协调成本和借款人融资渠道影响。
Abstract We use a threshold-based design to study ex post discretion in lenders’ contractual enforcement of covenant violations. At preset thresholds, lenders enforce contractual breaches only infrequently, but this enforcement is associated with material consequences (e.g., fees and renegotiations). Enforcement varies significantly over time and peaks when credit conditions are tightest, indicating that enforcement is procyclical. Costly coordination reduces enforcement: Syndicates with ex ante restrictive voting requirements enforce at lower rates. Consistent with theories of lender competition and implicit contracting, enforcement rates are lower for borrowers with access to alternative sources of financing and well-reputed lead arrangers.