The Structure and Dynamics of Movement Participation
构建了一个动态网络模型，解释在没有选择性激励的情况下，理性个体如何通过社会互动中的平衡寻求，自发参与集体行动并引发成功的社会运动。
We develop a dynamic network model of collective action that explains how collective action can arise in the absence of selective incentives or disincentives from the voluntary action of rational actors in large groups.We show that the search for balance in social interaction among interdependent actors can yield a cascade of activism and result in a successful social movement.The characteristics of actors critical for movement success are identified.We also explore the structural conditions underlying a successful cascade of activism and thus identify the social dynamics of and the structural conditions for collective action in human society.X V develop and test a dynamic model that accounts for voluntary collective action across a range of contexts.These diverse contexts enable us to identify the social dynamics of and the structural conditions for collective action in human society.Our model yields results that sharply challenge arguments that rational actors will not contribute to the provision of a collective good, preferring instead to free-ride on the efforts of others.By extension, our results challenge Olson's (1965) argument that collective goods are produced only as a byproduct of actors' pursuits of other goods, notably selective incentives or disincentives.Our results fit empirical observations of social movements: Specifically, even when their own contributions do not appear to count, when costs appear to exceed benefits, when risks come to outweigh rewards, and when success cannot be realized unless many people pool their resources and act in concert, rational individuals will participate in social movements that provide collective goods.They do so without constraint and without concern for the selective incentives or disincentives that may accrue to them by virtue of their participation.We show how and when such actions yield movement success.PREVIOUS MODELS Because empirical observations of voluntary participation in collective actions defy Olson's prediction, other scholars have proposed alternatives to Olson's general model.These alternatives focus on the interdependence of individual actors.Noting that Olson's predictions assume that actors behave as if they were social isolates, others argue that models that recognize interdependence among individuals may resolve Olson's collective action problem (Granovetter 1978; Fireman and Gamson 1979; Coleman 1990).Despite consensus on the importance of interdependent actors in explaining voluntarism in collective action, none of the models proposed to date provides a meaningful theoretical alternative to Olson's argument.In addition to the assumption that rationality is central to individual action, a meaningful alternative must satisfy the following conditions