Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers
利用1992-1994年数据研究共同基金经理的劳动力市场，发现年轻经理因业绩不佳被解雇的风险更高，这促使他们减少非系统性风险并倾向于投资热门板块。
We examine the labor market for mutual fund managers. Using data from 1992–1994, we find that “termination” is more performance-sensitive for younger managers. We identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination-performance relationship. The shape of the termination-performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk. Direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to “herd” into popular sectors. Consistent with these incentives, we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios. Promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied.