Asymmetric Monitoring of Quarterly Financial Statements by Big 4 Auditors and the SEC's Timely Review Requirement
研究发现四大会计师事务所在抑制增发新股前后的正向盈余管理上比非四大更有效，而SEC的季度报告及时审查要求进一步提升了盈余质量，尤其对四大客户效果显著。
SYNOPSIS We investigate if Big 4 firms are asymmetrically more effective than non-Big 4 firms in monitoring income-increasing versus income-decreasing quarterly earnings management. We also study the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) 2000 requirement that audit firm reviews of quarterly financial statements be completed prior to their filing with the SEC (“timely reviews”). We find Big 4 firms are more effective than non-Big 4 firms in curbing income-increasing earnings management around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), but not income-decreasing earnings management around open market repurchases (OMRs). In the post-2000 period, after the SEC's mandate for timely reviews began, we find income-increasing earnings management around SEOs declined significantly, and this decline is primarily driven by the clients of Big 4 firms. We provide evidence that timely quarterly reviews improve earnings quality, especially when companies have incentives to engage in income-increasing accruals and are reviewed by Big 4 firms.