CHARITY AUCTIONS*
比较了慈善拍卖中第一价格、第二价格和全支付拍卖的均衡出价与收入，发现拍卖形式影响收入，但若拍卖人可设保留价和费用并威胁取消拍卖，则收入等价成立。
In a charity auction the public‐goods nature of auction revenue affects bidding incentives. We compare equilibrium bidding and revenue in first‐price, second‐price, and all‐pay charity auctions. Bidding revenue typically varies by selling format. First‐price auctions are less lucrative than second‐price and all‐pay auctions, and with sufficiently many bidders the all‐pay auction has the highest bidding revenue. However, revenue equivalence applies when the auctioneer can set a reserve price and fees plus threaten to cancel the auction. If the auctioneer cannot threaten cancellation, a reserve and bidding fee can augment revenue but again revenue varies by auction format