Vendor Financing
证明，即使银行业完全竞争，拥有市场势力的企业也应提供卖方融资，当信贷客户保留价格低于现金客户，或逆向选择使分离信贷合同不可行时。分析了卖方融资优势如何取决于现金与信贷市场的相对规模、信贷客户异质性及行业企业数量。
ABSTRACT This paper shows that, even in the presence of a perfectly competitive banking industry, it is optimal for firms with market power to engage in vendor financing if credit customers have lower reservation prices than cash customers or if adverse selection makes it infeasible to write credit contracts that separate customers according to their credit risk. We analyze how the advantage of vendor financing depends on the relative size of the cash and credit markets, the heterogeneity of credit customers, and the number of firms in the industry.