DYNASTIC MANAGEMENT
研究了富裕与贫穷国家公司治理的显著差异：贫穷国家更依赖家族代际传承的王朝式管理。如果继承人缺乏管理才能，这种管理会降低企业全要素生产率，而合同执行不完善是导致王朝式管理盛行的重要原因。
The most striking difference in corporate‐governance arrangements between rich and poor countries is that the latter rely much more heavily on the dynastic family firm, where ownership and control are passed on from one generation to the other. We argue that if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision making, dynastic management is a failure of meritocracy that reduces a firm's total factor productivity (TFP). We present a simple model that studies the macroeconomic causes and consequences of dynastic management. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends, among other factors, on the imperfections of contractual enforcement. A plausible calibration suggests that, via dynastic management, poor contract enforcement may be a substantial contributor to observed cross‐country differences in aggregate TFP .