The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Developing Countries
本文探讨发展中国家通货膨胀的政治因素，指出传统模型忽视政治考量，并讨论基于政府战略行为和消耗战的新模型，用智利数据检验政治商业周期模型，发现其有助于解释通胀演变，还利用跨国数据研究货币贬值危机的政治经济背景。
This paper deals with political aspects of inflation and stabilization in developing countries. It is argued that by ignoring political considerations, traditional models failed to fully understand the dynamics of inflation. Several newer models are discussed, • including models based on strategic government behavior and war of attrition models. Empirical results obtained with developing countries data are discussed in detail. Date on Chile are used to test several versions of political business cycle models. It is found that this perspective helps explain the evolution of inflation through time in that country. Finally, data on a large cross section of countries are used to investigate the politicaleconomy circumstances surrounding major devaluation crises.