Speculative attacks on a monetary union?
本文论证了完全货币联盟能消除私人投机攻击固定汇率制的渠道，因为攻击后政府需付出高昂成本；但EMU过渡安排缺乏这种稳定性，而“欧元化”政策可降低其脆弱性。
This paper develops the idea that full monetary union eliminates the channels through which private speculative attacks have typically ended fixed exchange rate regimes. Profitable speculation against the regime would require government actions following a regime change that are prohibitively costly to the government. The inherent stability of a full monetary union is not a feature of transitional arrangements as currently envisioned for the EMU. A relatively simple but unconventional policy initiative of ‘euroization’ can considerably reduce the vulnerability of transitional arrangements to speculative attack. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.