Depositors' Welfare, Deposit Insurance, and Deregulation
构建模型研究最优存款保险政策，分析放松管制对存款人福利和保险系统稳健性的影响，发现风险与回报的关系决定最优监管水平，且风险敏感保费和资本要求可能无效。
We develop an analytical model to address the question of optimal deposit insurance policy and to examine the impact of deregulation on depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. We find that the optimal level of regulation depends critically on the functional relationship between risk and return. We show that in general deregulation of bank activities and/or of deposit rate ceilings will in volve tradeoff between depositors' welfare and the soundness of the insurance system. Our analysis also indicates that risk-sensitive premium and capital requirement schedules may not be efficient in managing the risk of banks.