Inheriting Losers
研究发现，接管共同基金的新经理会以高于其他动量分位股票的比例卖出继承的动量失败者股票，且外部招聘时更明显；继续留任的经理倾向于持有失败者，可能源于行为偏差或职业保护动机。卖出失败者有助于改善基金业绩。
We show that new managers who take over mutual fund portfolios sell off inherited momentum losers at higher rates than stocks in any other momentum decile, even after adjusting for concurrent trades in these stocks by continuing fund managers. This behavior is observed regardless of fund characteristics and is stronger when new managers are external hires. The tendency of continuing fund managers to hold on to losers could be consistent with either a behavior bias stemming from an inability to ignore the sunk costs associated with the stocks' past underperformance or a conscious desire to protect their careers by not admitting prior mistakes. Furthermore, we present evidence that selling off loser stocks helps improve fund performance. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.