Elicitation of Strategy Profiles in Large Group Coordination Games
在大型群体市场进入博弈中，使用策略方法诱导个体完整策略轮廓，发现加总进入频率与均衡解吻合良好，但个体策略大多不支持混合均衡，约半数缓慢收敛至阈值决策规则。
Abstract The strategy method is an experimental procedure for eliciting a complete strategy of play for all information sets, not only the ones that happen to be reached during the course of a play of a game. We use it to elicit individual strategy profiles for a class of large group, market entry games in which the payoff for a player who enters on a given market capacity value decreases linearly in the difference between the capacity value and the corresponding number of entrants. Our results show that the aggregate frequencies of entry do not differ from previous results obtained under the more common decision method. Under both methods, the number of entrants across a large set of market capacity values is organized remarkably well by the equilibrium solution. In contrast, the individual profiles do not support mixed equilibrium play; only three of the sixty profiles suggest attempts at randomization or “mixing” between periods. About half of the individual profiles appear to converge, albeit slowly, to cutoff decision policies and more than a quarter of the profiles exhibit a variety of patterns that defy classification.