搅动泡沫

Churning Bubbles

Review of Economic Studies · 1993
被引 293
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

这篇论文探讨在投资者与投资经理信息不对称时,经理为牟利而频繁交易,导致资产价格偏离基本面并产生泡沫,对研究市场泡沫成因的学者有参考价值。

Abstract

Are stock prices determined by fundamentals or can "bubbles" exist? An important issue in this debate concerns the circumstances in which deviations from fundamentals are consistent with rational behaviour. When there is asymmetric information between investors and portfolio managers, portfolio managers have an incentive to churn; their trades are not motivated by changes in information, liquidity needs or risk sharing but rather by a desire to profit at the expense of the investors that hire them. As a result, assets can trade at prices which do not reflect their fundamentals and bubbles can exist.

信息不对称投资组合经理交易动机资产泡沫